2001 |
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| 1. | Ramaswamy, Ramakrishna Genes, brains, and unpredictability: Developments in the sciences and reflections on what it means to be alive Journal Article Current Science, 80 (11), pp. 1381–1386, 2001, ISSN: 00113891. Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Brain, Genes @article{Ramaswamy2001, title = {Genes, brains, and unpredictability: Developments in the sciences and reflections on what it means to be alive}, author = {Ramakrishna Ramaswamy}, url = {https://ramramaswamy.org/papers/R30.pdf}, issn = {00113891}, year = {2001}, date = {2001-01-01}, journal = {Current Science}, volume = {80}, number = {11}, pages = {1381–1386}, abstract = {The most dramatic statement of the reductionist approach in the biological sciences is the ástonishing hypothesis’ of Francis Crick that something as central to our sense of self, namely the human soul, is in effect ‘no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules’. Recent advances such as the sequencing of entire genomes (the human genome being a well-publicized example) or the elucidation of some of the neuronal mechanisms associated with memory, for instance, appear to support this point of view, that we can eventually possess the recipe for human individuality. This essay contends that the essential limitation of such a programme stems not from the remaining problems of working out the details, but from the fact that living systems are fundamentally complex. Drawing on the ideas of deterministic chaos and complexity theory, it is proposed that while the broad contours of the connection between biological functioning, genetic information and the organization of its nervous system will be accessible, the unique developmental trajectory of any organism – that which constitutes the essence of individuality and confers a notion of being alive – will remain beyond the realm of precise scientific prediction.}, keywords = {Brain, Genes}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The most dramatic statement of the reductionist approach in the biological sciences is the ástonishing hypothesis’ of Francis Crick that something as central to our sense of self, namely the human soul, is in effect ‘no more than the behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules’. Recent advances such as the sequencing of entire genomes (the human genome being a well-publicized example) or the elucidation of some of the neuronal mechanisms associated with memory, for instance, appear to support this point of view, that we can eventually possess the recipe for human individuality. This essay contends that the essential limitation of such a programme stems not from the remaining problems of working out the details, but from the fact that living systems are fundamentally complex. Drawing on the ideas of deterministic chaos and complexity theory, it is proposed that while the broad contours of the connection between biological functioning, genetic information and the organization of its nervous system will be accessible, the unique developmental trajectory of any organism – that which constitutes the essence of individuality and confers a notion of being alive – will remain beyond the realm of precise scientific prediction. |